Substituting the constraints (10), (11), and (12) into equation (9), we obtain that equation (9) can be written as
Since low-quality technology is not sustainable, in equilibrium only firms that are expected (and have the incentive) to choose high-quality technology enter the market. This leads to the incentivecompatibility condition (20) . From expression (A-2) it is easy to see that entrepreneurs first issue debt up to debt capacityD, after which they will issue equity. Given expression (21), the maximum amount of equity that the marginal entrepreneur with cash flow X T * can issue is S * n * = (1 − β)η. This implies that n * is determined by D + S * n * = α n * 2 − βη = F H,n * = F H + θn * , (A-3) giving equation (13) . Inframarginal entrepreneurs will issue an amount of equity that is just sufficient to cover the fixed cost F H,i giving equation (15) . Thus, the fraction of equity sold to outside investors, κ i , is S * i /(1 − β)η, giving equation (17) . The payoff to the marginal entrepreneur, who given expression (A-3) sells all his shares to obtain entry, is µβη. The payoff to inframarginal entrepreneurs is thus equation (18). Finally, from equation (17), it is easy to see that 1 − κ i < µ
In addition, note that no additional entrepreneur with i > n * can enter when φ(
The proof is concluded by noting that expression (A-5) implies that -6) and, thus, all entrepreneurs that enter the market prefer to adopt high-quality technology rather than low-quality technology.
Proof of Proposition 2. The 1st result follows immediately from Proposition 1 and implicit function differentiation of equation (13), obtaining
The sign of ∂D ∂β follows from direct differentiation ofD in expression (21) and from expression (A-7). The sign of ∂S * i ∂β follows from the 1st equality in expression (15) and the previous result that
using expression (A-7), we obtain that
. The inefficiency of low-quality technology implies that n
Finally, expression (24) is obtained by substituting expression (A-7) into ε = β n * ∂n * ∂β , giving
which is increasing in η (since, in the Proof of Proposition 3, we will show that n * is decreasing in η).
Proof of Proposition 3. The 1st result that ∂n * ∂η < 0 follows immediately from Proposition 1 and implicit function differentiation of equation (13) 
The result that ∂ω i ∂η < 0 follows from expression (A-8) and
Proof of Proposition 4. Entrepreneurs maximize their expected profits, that is,
With the given cost function for effort, assuming that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, we can rewrite the entrepreneurs' objective function, (A-12), using our previous results, regarding B * i , as
Under our assumption that k ≤ k 1 , the 1st-order condition with respect to e i gives the optimal level of effort for all entrepreneurs i:
Entry to an industry occurs until the marginal entrepreneur's payoff equals 0. Hence, n * * satisfies
implying that n * * is implicitly determined by
A3
To see that n * * > n * , note that
We now need to show that, by exerting effort e * * , the marginal entrepreneur is able to raise financing, that is
Using expression (A-17), it is easy to check that expression (A-21) is verified when
The proof is concluded by noting that Assumption 1 holds with the previous definition of φ c and
Proof of Proposition 5. In this case, the financing constraint (A-21) fails with n * * firms in the market. Hence, fewer firms enter, and at the effort level e * * all entering firms would have strictly positive payoffs. This implies that for some marginal firms (which otherwise would be left out), it pays to exert an amount of effortê i > e * * in order to obtain entry. For these firms,ê i is set sufficiently high to raise the necessary funds to successfully enter the market, that is,
The number of firms in this equilibrium,n, is again determined by the condition that the marginal entrepreneur earns zero expected profits. That is, by
Substituting equation (A-24) to equation (A-25) gives
From equation (A-24) and the 1st-order condition for effort (A-16), it is easy to see that for other firms,ê
Taking the derivatives with respect to β and η gives
which implies, given our previous results for e * * , and the fact that ∂n ∂β < 0 and ∂n ∂η < 0, as can be verified using equation (A-25) , that these derivatives are positive also for other firms.
Proof of Proposition 6. Low-quality technology is sustainable in equilibrium if
When expression (A-32) holds, if the first n * firms choose high-quality technology, some additional marginal firms can enter the market by adopting low-quality technology. Let {n , n } be a candidate equilibrium in which n is the total number of firms in the industry and n ∈ [0, n ) is the number of firms that choose high-quality technology. Note first that, in the candidate equilibrium, firms with high-quality technology produceq * i = α n +φ(n −n ) , and sell their production at a pricep * i = c + α n +φ(n −n ) . This results in cash flow
A5
Thus, debt capacity for firms selecting high-quality technology is now equal to
In equilibrium, firms selecting high-quality technology finance D with debt and F H,i −D with equity.
The remaining n −n > 0 entrepreneurs who enter the market produce with low-quality technology, and with probability φ can produce superior quality goods in the quantityq * i . Furthermore, these firms can be financed entirely with debt; thus, they borrow D * i = F L + θn of debt with a face value
, and repurchase shares for D * i − F L,i . Equilibrium is determined by 3 conditions: (31), (32), and the entry condition for the n :th low-quality producer
Furthermore, 2 of the 3 conditions bind, equation(A-35) and either expression (31) or (32). Consider 2 cases: First, if µ ≥ φ, it is easy to verify that expression (31) implies expression (32) for all i ≥ 0
which holds for all β. In this case, using equation (A-35) and expression (31) as equalities gives
This can be used in equation (A-35) or expression (31) to substitute for either n or n to verify that n is decreasing in β, while n is increasing in β. Substituting for n from equation (A-37) into expression (31) and setting n = 0 gives that n ≥ 0 if and only if β ≤ β 1 , where β 1 is defined implicitly by
Second, if µ < φ, expression (A-36) holds for β ≤ β 2 , where β 2 is defined by
Letβ = I µ>φ β 1 + I µ<φ min(β 1 , β 2 ). Note that our assumption that F L > φF H implies thatβ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. When µ ≥ φ, or when µ < φ, but β 1 ≤ β 2 , let β =β. When µ < φ, but β 1 > β 2 , equation (A-35) and expression (32) hold as an equality for small enough n . Solving for n using equation (A-35) and expression (32), we can verify that n is decreasing in β. Thus, n = 0 whenever β > β 3 , where β 3 solves
Let β = I µ>φ β 1 + I µ<φ (I β 1 <β 2 β 1 + I β 1 >β 2 β 3 ). The result regarding the limit when θ → 0 follows from (A-38), since in the limit β 1 < β 2 when µ < φ.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is similar to the Proof of Proposition 1, and is only sketched.
Taking again n • andp as given, entrepreneurs choosing high-quality technology set p i = α pn • , which gives p (1 − β)η of equity, using a similar line of reasoning as the one in the Proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that n • firms producing all with high-quality technology can enter the market, where n • is the positive root of
, it is easy to show (along the lines in the Proof of Proposition 1) that all incumbents prefer to use high-quality technology, and that there cannot be any entry of firms that use low-quality technology when φ ≤ φ (1−δ)(1−β)η . Direct calculation now gives that
Proof of Proposition 9. Low-quality technology is sustainable in equilibrium if
When expression (A-46) holds, as in the limiting case where δ = 0, the 1st n • firms choose highquality technology and n • − n • select low-quality technology. Equilibrium is determined by 3 conditions: The entry condition for the n • :th entrepreneur,
the condition that entrepreneurs prefer to raise F H,n , and select high-quality technology, rather than to raise F L,n and select low-quality technology, that is, -48) and the entry condition for the n • :th low-quality producer, 
This is satisfied when
In this case, using expressions (A-47) and (A-49) as equalities gives
This can be used in expression (A-47) or (A-49) to substitute for either n • or n • to verify that n • is decreasing in δ, while n • is increasing in δ. The claim on total production can now be verified, as an increase in δ must lead to a decrease in total output α / p as p = α n • +φ(n • −n • )
, which increases by equation (A-49) , given the result that n • increases in δ.
Proof of the Claims Related to Table 1 .
The comparative statics results for n * follow from the results in Propositions 2 and 3 and equation (13). The comparative statics results in Table 1 related to the partial derivatives with respect to η follow from the results in Propositions 2 and 3 given that the ratios are
The comparative statics results for the partial derivative with respect to β also follow from the results in Propositions 2 and 3. First note that
